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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the comparative properties of empirically-estimated monetary 
models  of  the  U.S.  economy  using  a  new  database  of  models  designed  for  such 
investigations.  We focus on three representative models due to Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Taylor (1993a).  Although these models differ 
in  terms  of  structure,  estimation  method,  sample  period,  and  data  vintage,  we  find 
surprisingly similar economic impacts of unanticipated changes in the federal funds  rate. 
However, optimized monetary policy rules differ across models and lack robustness. Model 
averaging offers an effective strategy for improving the robustness of policy rules.  
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  I. Introduction 
Ever since the 1970s revolution in macroeconomics, monetary economists have been 
building quantitative models that incorporate the fundamental ideas of the Lucas critique, 
time inconsistency, and forward-looking expectations, in order to evaluate monetary policy 
more  effectively.    The  common  characteristic  of  these  monetary  models,  compared  with 
earlier models, is the combination of rational expectations, staggered price and wage setting, 
and policy rules, all of which have proved essential to policy evaluation.  
  Over the years the number of monetary models with these characteristics has grown 
rapidly as the ideas have been applied in more countries, as researchers have endeavoured to 
improve  on  existing  models  by  building  new  ones,  and  as  more  data  shed  light  on  the 
monetary  transmission  process.  The  last  decade,  in  particular,  has  witnessed  a  surge  of 
macroeconomic model building as researchers have further developed the microeconomic 
foundations of monetary models and applied new estimation methods.    In our view it is 
important for research progress to document and compare these models and assess the value 
of model improvements in terms of the objectives of monetary policy evaluation.  Keeping 
track of the different models is also important for monetary policy in practice because by 
checking the robustness of policy in different models one can better assess policy.  
    With these model comparison and robustness goals in mind we have recently created 
a new “monetary model database,” an interactive collection of models that can be simulated, 
optimized, and compared. The monetary model database can be used for model comparison 
projects and policy robustness exercises.  Perhaps because of the large number of models and 
the  time  and  cost  of  bringing  modellers  together,  there  have  not  been  many  model 
comparison projects and robustness exercises in recent years. In fact the most recent policy 
robustness exercise, which we both participated in, occurred 10 years ago as part of an NBER 
conference.
1    4 
Our monetary model database provides a new platform that makes model comparison 
much easier than in the past and allows individual researchers easy access to a wide variety of 
macroeconomic models and a standard set of relevant benchmarks.
2 We hope in particular 
that many central banks will participate and benefit from this effort as a means of getting 
feedback on model development efforts.   
  This paper investigates the implications of three well-known models included in the 
model database for monetary policy in the U.S. economy. The first model, which is a multi-
country  model  of  the  G-7  economies  built  more  than  fifteen  years  ago,  has  been  used 
extensively in  the earlier model  comparison  projects.    It is  described  in detail  in  Taylor 
(1993a).  The  other  two  models  are  the  best  known  representatives  of  the  most  recent 
generation of empirically estimated new Keynesian models, the Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (2005) model of the United States and the Smets and Wouters (2007) model of the 
United States.  
The latter two models incorporate the most recent methodological advances in terms 
of modelling the implications of optimizing behavior of households and firms. They also 
utilize new estimation methods.  The Christiano, Eichenbaum  and Evans  (2005) model is 
estimated to fit the dynamic responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy 
shock  identified  with  a  structural  vector  autoregression.  The  Smets  and  Wouters  (2007) 
model is estimated with Bayesian methods to fit the dynamic properties of a range of key 
variables in response to a full set of shocks.  
  First, we examine and compare the monetary transmission process in each model by 
studying the impact of monetary policy shocks in each model.  Second, we calculate and 
compare the optimal monetary policy rules  within  a certain  simple class  for each of the 
models. Third, we evaluate the robustness of these policy rules by examining their effects in 
each of the other models relative to the rule that would be optimal for the respective model.    5 
  The model comparison and robustness analysis reveals some surprising results.  Even 
though  the  two  more  recent  models  differ  from  the  Taylor  (1993a)  model  in  terms  of 
economic  structure,  estimation  method,  data  sample  and  data  vintage,  they  imply  almost 
identical estimates of the response of U.S. GDP to an unexpected change in the federal funds 
rate, that is, to a monetary policy shock.  This result is particularly surprising in light of 
earlier findings by Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999, 2003) indicating that a number of 
models built after Taylor (1993a) exhibit quite different estimates of the impact of a monetary 
policy  shock  and  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism.
3  We  also  compare  the  dynamic 
responses to other shocks. Interestingly, the impact of the main financial shock, that is the 
risk premium shock, on U.S. GDP is also quite similar in the Smets and Wouters (2008) and 
the Taylor (1993) model. This finding is of interest in light of the dramatic increase in risk 
premia observed since the start of the financial crisis in August 2007.
4  Differences emerge 
with regard to the consequences of other demand and supply shocks.  
  The  analysis  of  optimized  simple  interest  rate  rules  reveals  further  interesting 
similarities and differences across the three models. All three models prefer rules that include 
the lagged interest rate in addition to inflation deviations from target and output deviations 
from potential.  The two more recent new Keynesian models favour the inclusion of the 
growth rate of output gaps.  
The  robustness  exercise,  however,  delivers  more  nuanced  results.  Model-specific 
rules with interest rate smoothing and output gaps are not robust. Some degree of robustness 
can be recovered by focusing on 2-parameter rules with inflation and the output gap, or 3-
parameter rules with interest-rate smoothing, inflation and the deviation of output growth 
from trend instead of output gap growth. This increase in robustness vis-à-vis other models 
comes at the cost of significant performance deterioration in the original model. Fortunately, 
however, model comparison offers an avenue for improving over the robustness properties of   6 
model-specific rules. Rules that are optimized with respect to the average loss across multiple 
models achieve very good robustness properties at much lower cost. 
 
II. Brief Description of the Models 
 
A.  Taylor (1993a) 
  This is an econometrically-estimated rational expectations model fit to data from the 
G7 economies  for the period 1971:1 to  1986:4.  All  our simulations focus  on the United 
States. The model was built to evaluate monetary policy rules and was used in the original 
design  of  the  Taylor  rule.    It  has  also  been  part  of  several  model  comparison  exercises 
including Bryant et al (1985), Klein (1991), Bryant et al (1993) and Taylor (1999).  Shiller 
(1991) compared this model to the “old Keynesian” models of the pre-rational expectations 
era, and he found that there were large differences in the impact of monetary policy due 
largely to the assumptions of rational expectations and more structural models of wage and 
price stickiness. 
  To model wage and price stickiness Taylor (1993a) used the staggered wage and price 
setting approach rather than ad hoc lags of prices or wages which characterized the older pre-
rational expectations models.  However, because the Taylor (1993a) model was empirically 
estimated  it  used  neither  the  simple  example  of  constant-length  four-quarter  contracts 
presented in Taylor (1980) nor the geometrically-distributed contract weights proposed by 
Calvo (1983).  Rather it lets the weights have a general distribution which is empirically 
estimated  using  aggregate  wage  data  in  the  different  countries.  In  Japan  some 
synchronization is allowed for.  
  The  financial  sector  is  based  on  several  “no-arbitrage”  conditions  for  the  term 
structure of interest rates and the exchange rate.  Expectations of future interest rates affect 
consumption  and  investment,  and  exchange  rates  affect  net  exports.  Slow  adjustment  of   7 
consumption and investment is  explained by adjustment costs such as habit formation or 
accelerator  dynamics.  A  core  principle  of  this  model  is  that  after  a  monetary  shock  the 
economy returns to a growth trend, which is assumed to be exogenous to monetary policy as 
in the classical dichotomy. 
  Most  of  the  equations  of  the  model  were  estimated  with  Hansen’s  instrumental 
variables  estimation  method,  with  the  exception  of  the  staggered  wage  setting  equations 
which were estimated with maximum likelihood.    
 
B.  Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005)  
Many of the equations in the model of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (CEE 2005 
in  the  following)  exhibit  similarities  to  the  equations  in  the  Taylor  model,  but  they  are 
explicitly-derived  log-linear  approximations  of  the  first-order  conditions  of  optimizing 
representative firms and households.  Their model also assumes staggered contracts but with 
Calvo weights and backward-looking indexation in those periods when prices and wages are 
not set optimally.  Long-run growth and short-run fluctuations are modelled jointly rather 
than separately as in Taylor’s model. Thus, the CEE (2005) model explicitly accounts for 
labor supply dynamics as well as the interaction of investment demand, capital accumulation 
and utilization. Furthermore, their model includes a cost-channel of monetary policy. Firms 
must borrow working capital to finance their wage bill. Thus, monetary policy rates have an 
immediate impact on firms’ profitability.  
The CEE (2005) model was estimated for the U.S. economy over the period 1959:2-
2001:4 by  matching the impulse response function to the monetary shock in  a structural 
vector autoregression (VAR).  An important assumption of the VAR that carries over to the 
model is that monetary policy innovations affect the interest rate in the same quarter, but 
other variables, including output and inflation, only by the following quarter.      8 
The monetary policy innovation represents the single, exogenous economic shock in 
the original CEE model.  However, additional shocks can be incorporated in the structural 
model and the variance of such shocks may be estimated using the same methodology. The 
additional shocks would first be identified in the structural VAR. Then, the parameters of the 
structural  model  including  innovation  variances  would  be  re-estimated  by  matching  the 
impulse response functions implied by the model with their empirical counterparts from the 
VAR.    Altig, Christiano,  Eichenbaum  and  Linde (2004),  (ACEL 2004  in  the following), 
follow  this  approach  and  identify  two  additional  shocks  –  a  neutral  and  an  investment-
specific  technology  shock.    These  shocks  exhibit  serial  correlation  and  have  permanent 
effects on the level of productivity.   Together with the monetary policy shock they account 
for about 50% of the variation in output. The impulse response function for the monetary 
policy shock in ACEL (2004) is almost identical to CEE (2005).  Therefore, we will use the 
ACEL (2004) parameterization of the CEE model for the computational analysis in our paper. 
A drawback of this model is that it does not yet provide a complete characterization of the 
observed output and inflation volatility.  
The CEE model, which was initially circulated in 2001, represented the first medium-
sized,  estimated  example  of  the  new  generation  of  New-Keynesian  dynamic  stochastic 
general  equilibrium  models  explicitly  derived  from  optimizing  behavior  of  representative 
households and firms.
5 It stimulated the development of similar optimization-based models 
for many other countries once Smets and Wouters (2003) showed how to make use of new 
advances  in  Bayesian  techniques  (see  e.g.  Geweke  (1999)  and  Schorfheide  (2000))  in 
estimating such models.  
 
C.  Smets and Wouters (2007)   
The model of the U.S. economy estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW 2007 in the 
following) with U.S. data from 1966:1 to 2004:4 may be viewed as an extended version of   9 
the CEE/ACEL model. The SW model contains a greater set of macroeconomic shocks and 
aims  to  fully  explain  the  variation  in  key  variables,  such  as  aggregate  output  and  its 
components as well as inflation, wages and interest rates.  They use a Bayesian estimation 
methodology that allows the use of priors on model parameters informed from theory and 
literature.  The  posterior  distributions  then  incorporate  the  information  in  the  available 
macroeconomic data. Whenever the data does not help in pinpointing parameter values very 
precisely, theoretical priors dominate. Such priors can in some cases be based on evidence 
from  microeconomic  studies.  The  Bayesian  estimation  methodology  has  quickly  been 
popularized and widely applied by researchers in central banks and academia. It has been 
implemented for use with the DYNARE software that we also utilize in our model base. 
Smets and Wouters (2007) modify some of the structural assumptions embodied in the 
CEE/ACEL model. In the long-run, the SW model is consistent with a balanced steady-state 
growth path driven by deterministic labor-augmenting technological progress. While the CEE 
model assumes wages and prices are indexed to last period’s inflation rate in the absence of a 
Calvo-style signal, the SW model allows firms to index to a weighted average of lagged and 
steady-state  inflation.  Furthermore,  SW  drop  two  more  assumptions  that  have  important 
short-run implications in the CEE/ACEL model. First, they do not impose the delayed effect 
of monetary policy on other variables that CEE built into the structural model so as to match 
the constraints required by the structural VAR to identify monetary policy shock.   Second, 
SW (2007) do not require firms to borrow working capital to pay the wage bill. Thus, the so-
called cost channel is absent from the model. Smets and Wouters note that they did not find 
this channel necessary for fitting the dynamics in U.S. data.  In our simulations, we will also 
investigate the implications of adopting the SW assumptions of no cost channel and no timing 
constraints on monetary policy shocks in the original CEE/ACEL model.  
 
   10 
III. Shocks to Monetary Policy as Deviations from Two Policy Rules 
 
We  first  use  the  model  database  to  assess  the  extent  of  differences  between  models 
regarding  the  transmission  of  monetary  policy  to  output  and  inflation.    To  this  end  we 
compare the effect of monetary policy shocks in the three models.  A monetary policy shock 
is defined as a surprise deviation from systematic policy behavior which is characterized by 
interest rate policy rules.  
In our comparison, we focus on two estimated rules used by SW 2007 and CEE 2005 
respectively to characterize systematic central bank policy.   Smets and Wouters estimate the 
coefficients of this interest rate rule along with the other equations in their model. We refer to 
it as the SW rule in the remainder of the paper. They call it a generalized Taylor rule, because 
it includes the lagged federal funds rate, the lagged output gap, and a serially correlated 
policy shock, in addition to the current inflation rate and output gap that appear in the original 
Taylor (1993b) rule. The SW rule implies the following setting for the federal funds rate, it: 
 
(1)  1 1 1 0.81 0.39 0.97 0.90         
ai
t t t t t t i i y y ,  where 
i
t
i
t
i
t      1 15 . 0 . 
Here, πt
a refers to the annualized, quarterly inflation rate and yt to the output gap.
6 In the SW 
and CEE model the gap measure used in the policy rule is defined as the difference between 
the  actual  output  level  and  the  level  that  would  be  realized  if  prices  adjust  flexibly  to 
macroeconomic shocks, the so-called flex-price output level.
7 In the Taylor model (and the 
original Taylor rule) the output gap is defined as difference between actual output and long-
run potential output as measured by the trend. The policy shock is denoted by εt
i and follows 
a  first-order  autoregressive  process  with  an  independent  and  identically  distributed  (IID) 
normal error term, ηt
i.  As a result of serial correlation and the inclusion of the lagged interest 
rate  in  the  reaction  function,  an  IID  innovation  will  have  a  persistent  effect  on  nominal 
interest rates and due to price rigidity also on real rates and aggregate output.    11 
CEE (2005) define the central bank’s policy rule in terms of a reaction function for 
the growth rate of money.
8 They identify monetary policy shocks in a structural VAR as 
orthogonal  innovations  to  the  interest  rate  reaction  function.  Then,  they  estimate  the 
parameters of the structural model including the parameters of the money growth rule by 
matching  the  impulse  response  in  the  structural  model  and  the  VAR.  In  addition,  they 
contrast their findings under the money growth rule with the effect of a policy shock under an 
extended Taylor rule for the federal funds rate:
9   
(2)      11 0.80 0.3 0.08      
ai
t t t t t t i i E y . 
Just like the SW rule, it incorporates partial adjustment to the lagged federal  funds rate.  
However, it is forward-looking and responds to the expected inflation rate for the upcoming 
quarter. The coefficient on the output gap is much smaller than in the SW rule and it does not 
include the lag of the output gap. The policy shock is IID. In the following we refer to this 
rule as the CEE rule.  
 
IV. Monetary Policy Shocks in Three Monetary Models of the U.S. Economy 
 
We  compare  the  consequences  of  a  monetary  policy  shock  in  the  Taylor,  SW  and 
CEE/ACEL  models  to  shed  light  on  their  implications  for  the  transmission  of  Federal 
Reserve interest rate decisions to aggregate output and inflation. In particular, we want to find 
out to what extent the current-generation DSGE models, CEE/ACEL (2004) and SW (2007), 
imply quantitatively different effects of monetary policy than the model by Taylor (1993a).  
Since the models differ in terms of economic structure and parameter estimates are obtained 
for different data series, estimation periods and data vintages, we would expect to obtain 
quantitatively different assessments of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Figure 1 reports the consequences of a 1 percentage point shock to the federal funds rate 
for nominal interest rates, output and inflation.   The panels on the left-hand side refer to the   12 
outcomes when the Federal Reserve sets interest rates following the initial shock according to 
the prescriptions of the SW rule, while the right-hand-side panels refer to the outcome under 
the CEE rule.  Each panel shows the findings from four model simulations. The dark solid 
line refers to the SW model, the light solid line to the TAYLOR model, the dashed line to the 
CEE/ACEL model and the dotted line to the CEE/ACEL model with SW assumptions.
10   
Surprisingly, the effect of the policy shock on real output and inflation given a common 
policy rule is very similar in the four models.  For example, under the SW rule the nominal 
interest rate increases on impact by 0.8 to 1 percentage points and then returns slowly to 
steady state, real output falls over three to four quarters to a trough of about -0.35 percent 
before returning to steady-state, and inflation declines more slowly with a trough of about -20 
basis points roughly 2 to 3 quarters later than output.   
The quantitative implications for real output in the Taylor (1993) and SW (2007) models 
are almost identical. The outcome under the CEE/ACEL model initially differs slightly from 
the other two models. In the quarter of the shock we observe a tiny increase in output, while 
inflation does not react at all. From the second quarter onwards output declines to the same 
extent as in the other two models but the profile is shifted roughly one quarter into the future. 
The decline in inflation is similarly delayed. Once we implement the CEE/ACEL model with 
the SW assumptions of no timing constraint on policy and no cost channel, the timing of  
output and inflation dynamics is more similar to the other two models.  
The outcome of a monetary policy shock given the Fed follows the CEE rule is shown in 
the right-hand-side panels of Figure 1.   Again, the magnitude of the effect of the policy 
shock on real output and inflation is almost identical in the Taylor model, the SW model and 
the  ACEL/CEE  model,  particularly  when  the  latter  model  is  implemented  with  the  SW 
assumptions.  Furthermore, the reduction in output is very similar to the case when the Fed 
follows the SW rule. The decline in inflation is a bit smaller.    13 
The original Lucas critique stated that a change in the systematic component of policy can 
have important implications for the dynamics of macroeconomic variables.  Thus, it is not 
surprising  that  the  output  and  inflation  effects  of  monetary  policy  shocks  change  if  we 
consider a wider set of monetary policy rules. For example, in the case of the original Taylor 
(1993b) rule an IID policy shock would influence the nominal interest rate  only for one 
period,  because  the  Taylor  rule  does  not  include  the  lagged  interest  rate.  We  have 
investigated  the  real  output  effects  of  a  monetary  policy  shock  with  different  response 
coefficients  (for  example,  a  four  times  smaller  response  to  output),  different  inflation 
measures (such as year-on-year inflation) and different rules such as the original Taylor rule 
or the benchmark rules considered in Levin, Wieland and Williams (2003) and Kuester and 
Wieland (2010).  Different rules have quite different implications for the real consequences 
of monetary policy shocks. However, the Taylor model, the SW model and the CEE model 
continue to imply surprisingly similar dynamics of aggregate real output and inflation  in 
response to a policy shock for a given, common policy rule.   
The finding that the two best-known models of the recent generation of new Keynesian 
models provide very similar estimates of the impact of a policy shock on U.S. real GDP as 
the model of Taylor (1993a) is particularly surprising in light of earlier comparison projects. 
For example, the comparison in Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) and (2003) indicated 
that models built and estimated after Taylor (1993a) such as the model of Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995)  or  the  Federal  Reserve’s  FRB/US  model  of  Reifschneider,  Tetlow  and  Williams 
(1999)  provided  different  assessments  of  the  U.S.  monetary  transmission  mechanism.  In 
particular, these models suggested that the impact of monetary policy shocks on real output 
would be longer-lasting and reach its peak more than a year after the initial impulse.  This 
view is often considered conventional wisdom among practitioners.   The model data base 
associated  with  this  paper  also  allows  users  to  replicate  the  above-mentioned  impulse 
response function comparison in the Fuhrer and Moore and FRB/US models.   14 
 So far we have focused on the overall effect of the policy shock on output and inflation. 
Now we turn to the effects on other macroeconomic variables. Figure 2 illustrates some 
additional common aspects of the transmission mechanism in the three models of the U.S. 
economy, while Figure 3 highlights interesting differences.  Monetary policy is assumed to 
follow the SW rule after the policy shock.
11 The real interest rate increases almost to the same 
extent in all three models as shown in panel 2a. As a result, aggregate consumption and 
aggregate investment decline.  The decline in consumption is smaller in the Taylor model 
than  in  the  other  two  models,  while  the  decline  in  investment  is  much  greater.  The 
quantitative comparison of the dynamics of GDP components, however, is hampered by the 
fact that the models use different deflators in generating real consumption and investment 
series.
12 Another similarity regarding monetary policy transmission in the three models is that 
real wages decline along with aggregate demand following the monetary policy shock.  
The three models  also exhibit some interesting differences regarding monetary policy 
transmission. For example, panels a. and b. in Figure 3 indicate that only the Taylor model 
accounts for international feedback effects.  As a result of the policy shock the US dollar 
appreciates temporarily in real trade-weighted terms.  Exports and imports, both, decline. 
However, the fall in imports is much greater than in exports and as a result net exports 
increase. The strong decline in imports occurs due to the domestic demand effect that figures 
very importantly in the U.S. import demand equation. The resulting increase in net exports 
partly offsets the impact of the large negative decline in investment demand on aggregate 
output in the Taylor model. Furthermore, panels c. through f. in Figure 3 illustrate that only 
the SW and CEE models account for the effects of the policy shock on labor supply, capital 
stock, the rental rate of capital and capital utilization.  All four measures decline in response 
to the monetary shock. This explanation of supply-side dynamics is missing from the Taylor 
model.  
   15 
V. Other Shocks and Their Implications for Policy Design 
 
Unexpected changes in monetary policy are of interest in order to identify aspects of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. When it comes to the question of policy design, however, 
the standard recommendation is to avoid policy surprises since they only generate additional 
output and inflation volatility. Instead optimal and robust policy design focuses on the proper 
choice of the variables and the magnitude of the response coefficients in the policy rule that 
characterizes the systematic component of monetary policy. The policy rule is then designed 
to stabilize output and inflation in the event of shocks emanating from other sectors of the 
economy.  In this respect, it is of interest to review and compare the potential sources of 
economic shocks in the three models under consideration. 
In  light  of  the  recent  financial  crisis,  we  start  by  comparing  the  effect  of  particular 
financial shocks.  Only the Taylor and SW models contain such shocks.  Figure 4 illustrates 
the effect  of an increase in  the term  premium  by  1 percentage point  on real  output and 
inflation in the Taylor and SW models. The initial impact of these shocks on real output is 
almost identical in the two models and lies between -0.22 and -0.24 percent of output.  This 
finding is particularly surprising since the shocks are estimated quite differently in the two 
models. In the Taylor model the term premium shock is estimated from the term structure 
equation directly using data on short- and long-term interest rates, that is, the federal funds 
rate versus 10-year US treasuries. In the SW model the risk premium shock is estimated from 
the consumption and investment equation. It assumes the term structure relation implicitly 
but uses no data on long-term rates. In earlier work on the euro area, Smets and Wouters 
(2003) included instead a consumption demand or preference shock. This shock is omitted in 
their model of the U.S. economy to keep the number of shocks in line with the number of 
observed variables. SW emphasize that the premium shock represents a wedge between the 
interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by the households   16 
and has similar effects as so-called net-worth shocks in models with an explicit financial 
sector such as Bernanke et al (1999).
13  
Figure 5 provides a comparison of what could be termed “demand” or “spending” shocks 
in the three models. These are shocks that push output and inflation in the same direction. 
The Taylor model contains many such shocks.  Panels 5a. and 5b. show the effects of shocks 
to  non-durables  consumption,  equipment  investment,  inventory  investment,  government 
spending and import demand on the output gap and inflation.  The SW model contains two 
shocks of this type, an exogenous spending shock that comprises government spending as 
well as net exports and an investment-specific technology shock.  The ACEL model contains 
an investment-specific technology shock that initially lowers inflation but then raises it. It has 
stronger long-term effects than the investment-specific technology shock in SW (2007).  
Figure 6 compares supply shocks in the three models, i.e. shocks that push output and 
inflation in opposite directions.  The Taylor model has a number of such shocks, in particular 
innovations to the contract wage equations, the final goods price equation, import prices and 
export prices.  The SW model contains price mark-up and wage mark-up shocks that are 
somewhat similar to the contract wage and aggregate price shocks in the Taylor model.  Only 
the SW and the ACEL models include neutral technology shocks. In the ACEL model these 
shocks have a long-term effect on productivity growth, while their effect on productivity 
growth in the SW model is temporary.  
  Comparing the three models, it is important to keep in mind that only the Taylor and 
SW model aim to fully explain the variation in the macroeconomic variables included in the 
model as an outcome of exogenous shocks and endogenous propagation. The ACEL model 
only  aims  to  explain that part of the variation  that is  caused by the three  shocks  in the 
structural VAR that was used to identify them. Figures 5 and 6 indicate that the investment-
specific  and  neutral  technology  shocks  in  the  ACEL  model  have  negligible  effects  on 
inflation. Consequently, the ACEL model omits most sources of inflation volatility outside of   17 
policy shocks and is of limited usefulness for designing monetary policy rules. With this 
caution in mind, we will nevertheless explore the implications of the ACEL model for policy 
design together with the other two models.  
 
VI. Optimal Simple Policy Rules in the Taylor, CEE/ACEL and SW Models 
 
The  first  question  on  policy  design,  that  we  address  concerns  the  models´ 
recommendations for the optimal policy response to a small number of variables in a simple 
interest rate rule. We start by considering rules that incorporate a policy response to two 
variables, that is, the current year-on-year inflation rate and the output gap as in the original 
Taylor (1993b) rule: 
(3)        0 t t t iy   . 
In the SW and ACEL models, the output gap y is defined as the deviation of actual output 
from the level of output that would be realized if the price level were fully flexible. This 
flexible-price output varies in response to some of the economic shocks. We use the same 
definition of flexible price output as in Smets and Wouters (2007).  In the Taylor model the 
gap is calculated relative to a measure of potential that grows at an exogenous rate.  
In a second step, we extend the rule to include the lagged nominal interest rate as in 
Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999, 2003): 
 
(4)        10 t t t t i i y        . 
 
Then,  we  also  include  the  lagged  output  gap  as  in  the  estimated  rule  in  the  Smets  and 
Wouters (2007) model: 
   18 
(5)        1 0 1 1 t t t t t i i y y          . 
 
We choose the response coefficients of the rules, that is (ρ, α, β0, β1), in each of the models by 
minimizing a loss function L that includes the unconditional variances of inflation, the output 
gap and the change of the nominal interest rate:  
 
(6)      ( ) ( ) ( ) yi L Var Var y Var i        . 
 
This form of loss function has been used extensively in earlier analyses, including the above-
mentioned  model  comparison  studies.  With  λΔi=0,  it  corresponds  to  the  unconditional 
expectation of a second-order approximation of household utility in a small New-Keynesian 
model  derived  from  microeconomic  foundations  as  shown  in  Rotemberg  and  Woodford 
(1999).    The  magnitude  of  the  implied  value  of  λy  is  very  sensitive  to  the  particular 
specification  of  overlapping  nominal  contracts:  random-duration  “Calvo-style”  contracts 
imply a very low value on the order of 0.01, whereas fixed-duration “Taylor-style” contracts 
imply a value near unity (see Erceg and Levin (2001)).  For this reason, we consider values of 
λy{0, 0.5,1}.  In addition, we assign a positive weight to interest volatility and consider 
values  of  λΔi{0.5,1}.    It  is  intended  to  capture  central  banks’  well-known  tendency  to 
smooth interest rates and to avoid extreme values of optimized response coefficients that 
would  be  very  far  from  empirical  observation  and  regularly  violate  the  non-negativity 
constraint on nominal interest rates (see Woodford (1999)).   
The optimized response coefficients are shown in Table 1.  It reports results for two-, 
three-  and four-parameter rules  in  the Taylor,  SW and CEE/ACEL models.  The central 
bank’s objective is assumed to assign a weight of unity to inflation and interest rate volatility 
and either a weight of zero or unity to output gap volatility.
14 First, with regard to two-
parameter rules all three models prescribe a large response coefficient on inflation and a   19 
small coefficient on the output gap, if the output gap does not appear in the loss function. If 
the output gap receives equal weight in the loss function then the optimal coefficient on 
output increases but remains quite a bit below the response to inflation. The coefficient on 
inflation declines in the SW and CEE/ACEL models but increases in the Taylor model when 
output appears in the loss function.  
  For three-parameter rules the optimized value of the coefficient on the lagged nominal 
interest rate is near unity. This property applies in all three models and with different values 
of the objective function weights except for one case that is discussed below. The coefficients 
on  inflation  are  much  smaller  than  in  the  two-parameter  rules  but  they  typically  remain 
positive.  
In the ACEL model the loss function is very flat.  There appear to be multiple local 
optima and the global optimum we identify has very extreme coefficients in the case of the 
three-parameter rule with a positive weight on output gap volatility in the loss function.
15  As 
noted earlier, a weakness of the ACEL model is that it only contains two technology shocks 
that explain little of the variation of inflation and output gaps but have permanent effects on 
the growth  of steady state output.  The ACEL model contains  no short-run demand and 
supply shocks as do the other two models. For this reason the model may not be considered 
suitable in its current form for an evaluation of the role of interest rate rules in stabilization 
policy.  Nevertheless, we continue to replicate the analysis conducted in the other two models 
also in the ACEL model throughout this paper.
16 
Next, we turn to the rules with four parameters that include the lagged output gap in 
addition to current output, inflation and the lagged interest rate.   The coefficients on the 
lagged interest rate typically remain near unity. Interestingly, the coefficient on the lagged 
output gap, that is β1, in the CEE/ACEL and SW models is almost equal to -β0, the coefficient 
on the current output gap.  Thus, the CEE/ACEL and SW models appear to desire a policy 
response to the growth rate of the output gap rather than its level. In fact, restricting β1=-β0   20 
and re-optimizing the response coefficients in these models implies a coefficient of 1.65 in 
the SW and 2.0 in the ACEL model, respectively. Changes in the other response coefficients 
are very limited. By contrast, in the Taylor model, which uses trend output as a measure of 
potential, the optimal coefficients on current and lagged output gaps are both positive.    
Different findings between the Taylor model and the SW and CEE/ACEL models may be 
due to different definitions of potential output. The flex-price output level used as a measure 
of potential in the SW and CEE/ACEL models exhibits substantial variation due to economic 
shocks  and  its  growth  rate  may  deviate  substantially  from  trend  growth.
17  Thus,  simply 
differencing  the  output  gap  in  our  policy  rule  does  not  eliminate  the  effect  of  different 
concepts of potential output on the optimized response coefficients. Instead, we proceed to 
evaluate the performance of a fourth class of rules that respond to the deviation of actual 
GDP growth from trend (or steady-state) growth, denoted by Δyt :  
(7)        1         t t t t i i y . 
In  this  manner,  potential  output  growth  is  defined  similarly  across  the  three  models. 
Researchers such as Orphanides (2003a) have recommended such rules as a way to reduce 
the impact of central bank misperceptions about the level of potential output on interest rate 
setting.
18  The last three rows in Table 1 report the optimal coefficients of the 3-parameter 
policy rule with deviations of actual from steady-state output growth.  
If  output  gap  variability  does  not  appear  in  the  loss  function,  (λy=0),  the  optimal 
coefficient on output growth, βΔy, is very close to zero, just as in the 3-parameter rules with 
the output gap, If output variability receives a weight of unity in the loss function, the optimal 
interest rate rule responds positively to output growth, at least in the Taylor and SW models. 
In the ACEL models it is near zero. Thus, in the SW and ACEL models, it matters quite a lot 
whether the rule uses the deviation of actual GDP growth from trend growth or from flexible-
price output growth.    21 
Table  2  reports  on  the  relative  stabilization  performance  with  two-,  three-  and  four-
parameter rules. Two different measures are reported, the percentage increase in loss and, in 
parentheses, the absolute increase in loss when one reduces the number of parameters (and 
therefore variables) in the policy rule starting from the case of four-parameter rules.  In the 
following, we will focus on the absolute loss differences because the percentage differences 
tend to give misleading signals.   
The  particular  measure  of  the  increase  in  absolute  loss  that  is  shown  is  the  implied 
inflation variability premium proposed by Kuester and Wieland (2010) (referred to as the IIP 
in  the following).  This  measure translates  a particular increase in  absolute loss  into the 
increase in the standard deviation of inflation (in percentage point terms) that would raise the 
loss to the same extent keeping all else equal (i.e. for a constant output or interest volatility). 
The advantage of this measure is that it is easily interpreted in practical terms and therefore 
provides  a  clear  signal  of  those  properties  of  interest  rate  rules  that  are  of  economic 
importance.   
To give an example, consider the number in the fourth row and third column of Table 2 
in parentheses. Its value is 2.14 and it implies the following: if the Taylor model represents 
the U.S. economy and the central bank considers using the optimized two-parameter rule 
instead of an optimized three-parameter rule, and if the central bank’s loss-function assigns 
equal weight to output and inflation, the resulting increase in loss (due to higher inflation, 
output and interest volatility) is equivalent to an increase in the standard deviation of inflation 
of  2.14  percentage  points  all  else  equal.    This  difference  is  economically  important. 
Although, it is the largest  IIP reported in the table the associated percentage increase of 
98.8% is only the fourth-largest in the table. The third-largest percentage increase in the table 
is 229%. It is associated with a switch from the three-parameter to the two-parameter rule in 
the  ACEL  model  when  the  central  bank’s  loss  function  assigns  zero  weight  to  output 
volatility. However, the associated IIP of 0.04 is tiny.  Thus, the particular switch in rule is   22 
economically irrelevant in spite of the large percentage increase in loss. In this case, the 
reason is that the ACEL model only contains two shocks that cause little inflation volatility 
and very small losses.  
The findings in Table 2 suggest that there is little additional benefit from including the 
lagged output gap in the rule. Dropping the lagged output gap from the rule barely increases 
the central bank’s loss. The associated IIP’s in the first column of Table 2 lie between 0.001 
and 0.47.  However, it appears very beneficial to include the lagged interest rate in the rule. 
Dropping  the  lagged  interest  rate  from  the  rule  and  moving  from  three  to  two  response 
parameters implies an economically significant increase in the central bank’s loss function, in 
particular in the SW and Taylor models, where it is equivalent to an increase in the standard 
deviation of inflation by 1 and 2 percentage points, respectively, (3
rd column in Table 2).  
Among three-parameter rules, the rule with the output gap performs better than the rule with 
the growth rate of output (in deviation from trend growth) across all three models.  As shown 
in the middle column of Table 2 the IIP’s relative to the four-parameter rule are uniformly 
greater for the growth rate than the gap version.  They are particularly large in the Taylor 
model. However, the growth-rate version of the three-parameter rule still performs better than 
the 2-parameter rule with inflation and the output gap.  
 
VII. Robustness 
 
What if the model used by the central bank in designing a policy rule is not a good 
representation  of  the  economy  and  one  of  the  other  two  models  provides  a  much  better 
representation  of  the  U.S.  economy?    In  other  words,  how  robust  are  model-specific 
optimized policy rules with respect to the range of model uncertainty reflected in the three 
models considered in this paper?  Table 3 provides answers to these questions.  Robustness is 
measured in the following manner. The rule optimized for model X is implemented in model   23 
Y.   The resulting loss in model Y is compared to the loss that would be realized under the 
rule with the same number of parameters that has been optimized for that particular model.   
The difference is expressed in terms of IIP only. 
The findings in Table 3 show that from the perspective of a central bank that aims to 
minimize inflation and interest rate volatility but assigns no weight to output volatility (λy=0), 
all four classes of policy rules are quite robust.  Typically, a rule optimized in one of the 
models performs quite well in any of the other model compared to the best possible rule with 
the same number of parameters in that model.    
Unfortunately, the preceding conclusion is almost completely reversed when one takes 
the perspective of a policy maker who cares equally about output and inflation volatility, that 
is when λy=1.  In this case, only the 2-parameter rules remain fairly robust. The lack of 
robustness is most pronounced for 3- and 4-parameter rules that use output gaps. While these 
rules  offer  substantial  performance  improvements  when  the  true  model  is  known, 
performance  can  deteriorate  markedly  if  the  economy  is  better  approximated  by  another 
model. For example, using the 4-parameter rule that is optimal in the SW model instead in the 
Taylor model, implies an IIP of 2.71.  Alternatively, the 4-parameter rule optimized for the 
Taylor model implies an IIP of 7.18 in the SW model and generates multiple equilibria in the 
ACEL model.     
Similar problems arise with regard to 3-parameter rules that use the output gap, even if 
the CEE/ACEL model is excluded from the robustness analysis because of its odd behaviour 
under such rules as discussed earlier. As shown in the second column of Table 3, the rule 
optimized  in  the  Taylor  model  implies  an  IIP  of  5.41  in  the  SW  model,  while  the  rule 
optimized for the SW model delivers an IIP of 3.20 in the Taylor model.  Replacing the 
output  gap  in  the  3-parameter  rules  with  the  deviation  of  output  growth  from  its  trend 
improves their robustness properties at the cost of substantial performance deterioration in the 
true model as shown previously in Table 2. However, the IIP’s are not negligible and remain   24 
near or above unity in three cases, two of which concern the rule optimized in the ACEL 
model.  
Only the rules with two parameters that respond to inflation and the current output gap 
deliver a fairly robust stabilization performance across the three models. The IIP’s are always 
substantially below unity and often near zero. Thus, a policymaker with a strong preference 
for robustness against model uncertainty might prefer to choose an optimized two-parameter 
rule that responds to inflation and the output gap but not the lagged interest rate.  
Unfortunately,  such  rules  perform  quite  a  bit  worse  than  rules  with  interest-rate 
smoothing when it is known which of the models best captures the true dynamics in the 
economy.  To  quantify  this  loss,  we  re-evaluate  robustness  with  respect  to  the  best  4-
parameter rule when the model is known, rather than the best rule of the same class.  With 
respect to this benchmark 2-parameter rules exhibit IIP’s of 2.64 (SW rule in Taylor model) 
and 1.53 (Taylor rule in SW model), respectively.  Thus, they remain more robust than 3- and 
4-parameter rules with output gaps. However, 3-parameter rules that replace the output gap 
with  the  deviation  of  actual  GDP  growth  from  trend  perform  slightly  better  from  this 
perspective as long as the ACEL model is excluded from the comparison. They exhibit IIP’s 
of 2.28 (SW rule in Taylor model) and 1.21 (Taylor rule in SW model), respectively, when 
compared to the 4-parameter rule optimized for the correct model.   
  Using the model database, however, it is possible to produce policy recommendations 
that are more robust than those based on a single model. For example, one may optimize a 
particular policy rule with respect to multiple models by minimizing the average loss across 
models. This approach has been proposed by Levin, Wieland and Williams (2003) and Brock, 
Durlauf and West (2003), among others.  In this case, the response coefficients of the rules, 
(ρ, α, β0, β1, βΔ), are chosen to minimize the average loss across the three models:  
(8)       
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Here, the subscript m refers to a particular element of M={TAYLOR, SW, ACEL} – the set of 
available models.  We focus on the performance of such rules in those cases where model-
specific rules were not robust, that is when the central bank assigns similar weights to output 
and inflation in the loss function.  The parameter values for the model averaging rules are 
reported  in  Table  4.    The  2-parameter  rules  remain  fairly  similar  to  the  model-specific 
optimization because those were already quite robust. The interest-smoothing coefficient for 
3- and 4-parameter rules now lies very close to unity, in between the values that are optimal 
in the SW and the TAYLOR model. The response to inflation is small but positive ranging 
from 0.2 to 0.4 depending on whether the rules include current and lagged output gaps or the 
deviation  of  output  growth  from  trend.  Response  coefficients  on  the  current  output  gap, 
output gap growth or output growth deviations from trend vary between 0.2 and 0.8.  
  As shown in Table 5, model averaging generally improves the robustness of all four 
classes of simple policy rules that we have evaluated. Again, the numerical values reported in 
different cells of the table refer to the increase in the loss function – expressed in terms of 
inflation variability premia (IIP) – when a rule optimized in model X is used in model Y and 
evaluated  relative  to  the  same  type  of  rule  optimized  in  model  Y.  By  this  measure  2-
parameter rules that respond to inflation and the output gap are the rules that are most robust 
to model uncertainty.  The robustness properties of rules with interest rate smoothing that 
respond to inflation and output growth deviations from trend are slightly worse. However, 
this ordering can be reversed if the 4-parameter rule optimized in the correct model is used as 
benchmark (IIP values in parentheses) and the ACEL model is dropped from the comparison. 
More importantly, model averaging helps to identify rules with interest rate smoothing and a 
response to output gaps that are fairly robust to model uncertainty, while regaining much of 
the improvement in stabilization performance promised by such rules in the absence of model 
uncertainty.   26 
  We note that model averaging mirrors  Bayesian decision-making with equal prior 
beliefs.  Kuester  and  Wieland  (2010)  compare  Bayesian  decision-making  with  worst-case 
analysis and ambiguity aversion, which combines both objectives, in an application that deals 
with monetary policy modelling in the euro area. They also explore the impact of learning on 
posteriors and Bayesian objectives over time. 
    
VIII. Conclusions and Extensions 
 
The preceding comparison of the Taylor (1993a) model with the two well-known examples 
from the current generation of new Keynesian models of the U.S. economy by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) indicates a surprising similar 
monetary transmission mechanism.  The empirical, model-based assessment of the impact of 
an unanticipated change in the federal funds rate on real U.S. GDP has not changed in 14 
years that lie in between the publication of these models. This finding is encouraging for 
policy makers that want to rely on such models. It differs from earlier comparison projects 
which showed that models built later in the 1990s such as the FRB/US model suggested that 
the impact of policy shocks on real output was much more drawn out over time. Conventional 
wisdom on the lags of monetary policy decisions may therefore need to be revised.  
  The robustness analysis of simple policy rules with the three models reveals more 
diversity than the comparative assessment of the transmission mechanism. If the central bank 
has the task of stabilizing both output and inflation, then an optimal rule derived in one of our 
models is not robust in the other models.  By sacrificing optimality in each model one can 
identify some policy rules that are fairly robust, in particular, 2-parameter rules that respond 
to inflation and the output gap and 3-parameter rules that include interest rate smoothing but 
replace the output gap with the deviation of GDP growth from trend.    27 
We also find that model averaging substantially improves the robustness properties of 
policy rules.  Hence, using a model database, such as the one described in this paper, one can 
derive policy  rules that are more robust to model uncertainty than those obtained with a 
single preferred model.   
  Our  findings  also  suggest  at  least  two  important  extensions  focusing  on  the 
implications of utility-based loss functions and a wider range of macroeconomic models. 
 
A.  Utility Based Loss Functions  
We selected the loss function in equation (6) because  it has been used extensively in the past 
and because it corresponds to the unconditional expectation of a second-order approximation 
of  household  utility  in  a  small  New-Keynesian  model  derived  from  microeconomic 
foundations.  However, if the loss function is interpreted as  a measure  of utility, then its 
parameters (λy,λΔi) are model-dependent (as we noted previously) and the list of variables 
appearing in the loss function must be expanded. For example, if wage rigidities are present 
in addition to price rigidities, not only price but also wage fluctuations will affect household 
utility. Onatski and Williams (2004) derive the following quadratic approximation of  the 
unconditional expectation of household utility in the model of Smets and Wouters (2003): 
(9)     1
2
1
2
2004 51 . 0 21 . 0      t t t t OW K E L     ) )( ( 24 . 0 1     t t t t w w w  . 
 Here wt refers to the real wage and Kt-1 to the lagged capital stock.  To illustrate how such a 
loss function would affect our results, we optimized the four types of simple policy rules with 
respect to this utility-based loss in the SW model augmented with the variance of the change 
of  the  interest  rate.  Interestingly,  the  optimized  2-,  3-  and  4-parameter  rules  have  fairly 
similar welfare implications under the Onatski-Williams approximation of household utility 
in  the  Smets-Wouters  model  with  a  maximum  difference  of  1.17  in  IIP  terms.  We  also 
evaluate the robustness of rules optimized with respect to the simpler loss function defined by 
equation  (6)  under  this  new  loss  function.  Again,  model-specific  2-parameter  rules  with   28 
inflation and the output gap, and 3-parameter rules with interest-rate smoothing, inflation and 
output growth deviations from trend remain fairly robust, but not the other model-specific 
rules. More details about these results are available in the online/web appendix. 
 
B.  Robustness to Other Macroeconomic Models 
  While we have focused on three models of the U.S. economy, the  new monetary 
model database offers the possibility of comparing many other empirically estimated models.  
With regard to future research, it would be of great interest to investigate the robustness of 
monetary policy rules in models that offer a more detailed treatment of the financial sector. 
As an illustration we extended our model comparison and robustness analysis to include the 
model of De Graeve (2008). De Graeve introduces a financial intermediary, capital goods 
producers and entrepreneurs as in Bernanke et al (1999) in a medium-size DSGE model of 
the  same  type  as  the  CEE  and  SW  models  we  have  considered.  His  model,  which  he 
estimates with Bayesian methods, generates an endogenous external finance premium that is 
impacted by a variety of economic shocks. Interestingly, we find that the GDP response to a 
monetary policy shock in the De Graeve  (DG)  model remains very close to the impulse 
responses in the Taylor, SW and CEE/ACEL models reported in Figure 1. The robustness of 
optimized model-specific rules, however, deteriorates further once we include the DG model. 
Especially 2-parameter rules optimized in the DG model perform badly in the Taylor and SW 
models.    However,  model-averaging  rules  remain  very  robust.  In  fact,  they  need  not  be 
changed. Including the DG model in the model-averaging loss function defined by equation 
(8) has only a marginal effect on the optimal response coefficients in the policy rules.  More 
information about these results is available in the online/web appendix.     29 
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Table 1 
Optimal Simple Policy Rules
a  
Rules:  1 0 1 1               t t t t t t i i y y y  
Rule 
/Model 
Loss (λy = 0):  ( ) ( )   Var Var i   Loss (λy=1):  ( ) ( ) ( )     Var Var y Var i  
ρ  α  β0  β1  βΔ  ρ  α  β0  β1  βΔ 
  2 Parameters (Gap)
b   0    tt y  
TAYLOR    2.54  0.19        3.00  0.52     
SW    2.33  -0.10        2.04  0.26     
CEE/ACEL    4.45  0.28        2.57  0.45     
  3 Parameters (Gap)  10      t t t iy  
TAYLOR  0.98  0.37  0.09      0.98  0.21  0.53     
SW  1.06  0.49  0.01      1.13  0.012  0.015     
CEE/ACEL  0.97  0.99  0.02      2.84  7.85  -2.12      
  4 Parameters (Gaps)   1 0 1 1         t t t t i y y  
TAYLOR  0.98  0.37  0.07  0.02    0.96  0.18  0.41  0.19   
SW  1.06  0.46  -0.03  0.03    1.07  0.16  1.63  -1.62   
CEE/ACEL  1.01  1.11  0.18  -0.18    1.04  0.51  2.24  -2.30   
  3 Parameters (Growth)
c  1        t t t iy  
TAYLOR  1.01  0.52      0.07  1.13  0.40      0.68 
SW  1.03  0.48      -0.01  1.01  0.20      1.04 
CEE/ACEL  1.02  1.07      -.002  0  3.71      .002 
Notes:  
aThe loss function includes the variance of inflation and the variance of the first-difference of 
nominal interest rates with a weight of unity, λΔi =1.  λy denotes the weight on the variance of 
the output gap.    37 
bIn the Taylor model the output gap denotes the difference between actual and trend output. 
In the SW and ACEL models it is the difference to the level realized under flexible prices 
given current macroeconomic shocks.  
cThe output growth measure Δyt is defined relative to steady-state/trend output growth in all 
three models.   38 
Table 2 
Increase in Loss when Reducing the Number of Parameters in the Rule  
Percentage Increase (Increase in IIP)
a 
 
   
Models  Loss (λy = 0):  ( ) ( )   Var Var i  
  4 versus 3 
Parameters (Gaps) 
4 Parameters (Gaps) 
vs 3 Par. (Growth) 
3 versus 2 
Parameters (Gaps) 
       
TAYLOR  0.12% (0.001)  13.5% (0.10)  278% (1.38) 
SW  0.22% (0.001)  1.40% (0.01)  316% (0.78) 
CEE/ACEL  5.10% (0.001)  10.0% (0.003)  229% (0.04) 
   
  Loss(λy = 1):  ( ) ( ) ( )     Var Var y Var i   
TAYLOR  1.81% (0.07)  67.1% (1.61)  98.8% (2.14) 
SW  10.6% (0.47)  18.1% (0.76)  25.6% (1.17) 
CEE/ACEL  14.4% (0.11)  36.7% (0.22)  9.67% (0.11) 
Notes:  
aThe values in parentheses measure the increase in absolute loss in terms of the implied 
inflation (variability) premia proposed by Kuester and Wieland (2010). The IIP corresponds 
to the increase in the standard deviation of the inflation rate (in percentage point terms) that 
would imply an equivalent increase in absolute loss.    39 
Table 3 
Robustness of Policy Rules 
Increase in IIP
a when a rule optimized in model X is used in model Y  
and evaluated relative to the same type of rule optimized in model Y 
Loss (λy=0):  ( ) ( )   Var Var i  
IIP if evaluated in  Rules
b optimized in TAYLOR Model 
Model:  2 Parameters  3 Par. (Gap)  3 Par. (Growth)  4 Par. (Gaps) 
SW  0.37  0.83  0.01  0.90 
ACEL  0.03  0.12  0.01  0.14 
  Rules optimized in SW Model 
TAYLOR  0.27  0.13  0.03  0.15 
ACEL  0.15  0.02  0.01  0.02 
  Rules optimized in ACEL Model 
SW   0.54  0.11  0.10  0.09 
TAYLOR  0.76  0.27  0.25  0.34 
Loss(λy=1): ()  Var ( ) ( )    Var y Var i  
IIP if evaluated in:  Rules optimized in TAYLOR Model 
Model:  2 Parameters  3 Par. (Gap)  3 Par. (Growth)  4 Par. (Gaps) 
SW  0.17   5.41  0.66  7.18 
ACEL  0.001  M.E.
c  0.31  M.E.
3) 
  Rules optimized in SW Model 
TAYLOR  0.86  3.20  1.05  2.71 
ACEL  0.03  0.21  0.44  0.13 
  Rules optimized in ACEL Model 
SW   0.07  108  1.69  0.53   40 
TAYLOR  0.12  24.9  1.40  3.85 
Notes:  
a The values in this table concern the increase in absolute loss in model Y under a rule 
optimized for model X relative to a rule of the same class (2-,3-, 4-parameters) optimized in 
model Y. The increase is measured in terms of the implied inflation (variability) premia 
proposed by Kuester and Wieland (2010). The IIP corresponds to the increase in the standard 
deviation of the inflation rate (in percentage point terms) that would imply an equivalent 
increase in absolute loss. 
b Rules: 2 Parameters:  0    t t t iy ,  3 Parameters (Gap):  10        t t t t i i y ; 
3 Parameters(Growth),:  t t t t y i i          1 ; 4 Parameters (Gaps): 
1 0 1 1          t t t t t i i y y . 
c M.E. refers to indeterminacy and the existence of multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. 
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Table 4 
Optimized Model-Averaging Rules  
Objective: Min 
1
( ( ) ( ) ( ))
3


    m m m
mM
Var Var y Var i  
Rules:  1 0 1 1               t t t t t t i i y y y  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Set of equally-weighted models:  
  ,,  M SW TAYLOR ACEL   
   
ρ  α  β0  β1  βΔ 
           
2 Parameters Rule (Gap)     2.75  0.52     
3 Parameters Rule (Gap)  1.05  0.41  0.23     
3 Parameters Rule (Growth)  1.09  0.20      0.76 
4 Parameters rule (Gap)   1.06  0.19  0.67  -0.59     42 
Table 5 
Robustness of Model-Averaging Policy Rules 
Increase in IIP
a when a rule optimized in model X is used in model Y  
and evaluated relative to the same type of rule optimized in model Y 
Loss(λy=1): ()  Var ( ) ( )    Var y Var i  
IIP if evaluated in  2 Parameters  3 Par. (Gap)  3 Par. (Growth)  4 Par. (Gaps) 
SW  0.11 (1.50)
 b  1.02  0.13 (0.84)
 b  0.47 
TAYLOR  0.03 (2.18)
 b  0.56  0.19 (1.71)
 b  1.28 
ACEL  0.00 (0.17)
 b  0.27  0.40 (0.44)
 b  0.12 
Notes:  
a The values in this table concern the increase in absolute loss in model Y under a rule 
optimized by averaging over all models relative to a rule of the same class (2-,3-, 4-
parameters) optimized in model Y. The increase is measured in terms of the implied inflation 
(variability) premia proposed by Kuester and Wieland (2010). The IIP corresponds to the 
increase in the standard deviation of the inflation rate (in percentage point terms) that would 
imply an equivalent increase in absolute loss.  
b The values in parenthesis refer to the increase in absolute loss in model Y under a rule 
optimized by averaging over all models relative to a 4-parameter rule optimized in model Y.    
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Figure 1 
The Effect of a Policy Shock on Interest Rates, Output and Inflation 
1 Percentage Point Increase in the Nominal Policy Rate 
   44 
Figure 2  
Common Aspects of the Transmission Mechanism in the Three Models (SW Rule) 
   45 
Figure 3  
Differences in the Transmission Mechanism in the Three Models (SW Rule) 
 
   46 
Figure 4  
Term Premium Shock in the Taylor and SW Models (SW Rule) 
1 Percentage Point Increase in the Term Premium 
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Figure 5  
“Demand” Shocks in the Taylor, SW and CEE Models (SW Rule) 
1 Percent Increase in the Relevant Variables 
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Figure 6  
Short-Run and Long-Run “Supply” Shocks in Taylor, SW and CEE Models (SW Rule) 
1 Percent Increase in the Relevant Variables 
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Appendix 38 Models Included in the Model Base as of January 2011
19 
 
1. Small Calibrated Models  
 
1.1 Rotemberg, Woodford (1997)             NK_RW97 
1.2 Levin, Wieland, Williams (2003)            NK_LWW03 
1.3 Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999)             NK_CGG99 
1.4 Clarida, Gali, Gertler 2-Country (2002)           NK_CGG02 
1.5 McCallum, Nelson (1999)            NK_MCN99 
1.6 Ireland (2004)                NK_IR04 
1.7 Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1999)          NK_BGG99 
1.8 Gali, Monacelli (2005)              NK_GM05   
 
2. Estimated US Models  
 
2.1 Fuhrer, Moore (1995)               US_FM95 
2.2 Orphanides, Wieland (1998)             US_OW98 
2.3 FRB-US model linearized as in Levin, Wieland, Williams (2003)   US_FRB03 
2.4 FRB-US model 08 linearized by Brayton and Laubach (2008)     US_FRB08 
2.5 FRB-US model 08 mixed expectations, linearized by Laubach (2008)   US_FRB08mx 
2.6 Smets, Wouters (2007)               US_SW07 
2.7 CEE/ACEL Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, Linde (2004)    US_ACELm 
      (m=monetary policy shock, t=technology shock, sw=SW    US_ACELt 
      assumptions = no cost channel, no timing constraints)      US_ACELswm 
                            US_ACELswt 
2.8 New Fed US Model by Edge, Kiley, Laforte (2007)       US_NFED08   50 
2.9 Rudebusch, Svensson (1999)            US_RS99 
2.10 Orphanides (2003b)              US_OR03 
2.11 IMF projection model by Carabenciov et al. (2008)      US_PM08 
2.12 IMF projection model with financial linkages                                       US_PM08fl 
2.13 De Graeve (2008)              US_DG08 
2.14 Christensen, Dib (2008)             US_CD08 
2.15 Iacoviello (2005)               US_IAC05 
2.16 Mankiw and Reis (2007)                                                                         US_MR07 
 
3. Estimated Euro Area Models  
 
3.1 Coenen, Wieland (2005) (ta: Taylor-staggered contracts)     EA_CW05ta 
3.2 Coenen, Wieland (2005) (fm: Fuhrer-Moore staggered contracts)   EA_CW05fm 
3.3 ECB Area Wide model linearized as in Dieppe et al. (2005)       EA_AWM05 
3.4 Smets, Wouters (2003)               EA_SW03 
3.5. Euro Area Model of Sveriges Riksbank (Adolfson et al. 2007)   EA_SR07 
3.6. Euro Area Model of the DG-ECFIN EU (Ratto et al. 2009)    EA_QUEST3 
       
4.  Estimated Small Open-Economy Models (other countries) 
 
4.1 Model of the Chilean economy by Medina, Soto (2007)     CL_MS07 
4.2 ToTEM model of Canada, based on Murchison and Rennison (2006),  
     2010 vintage                                                                                               CA-ToTEM10 
4.3 Model of the Brazilian economy by Gouvey et al. (2008)                        BRA_SAMBA08  
   51 
5.  Estimated/Calibrated Multi-Country Models  
 
5.1 Taylor (1993a) model of G7 economies          G7_TAY93 
5.2 Coenen,Wieland (2002, 2003)  G3 economies         G3_CW03 
5.3 IMF model of euro area & CZrep by Laxton, Pesenti (2003)    EACZ_GEM03 
5.4 FRB-SIGMA model by Erceg, Gust, Guerrieri (2008)       G2_SIGMA08 
5.5. ECB New-Area Wide Model of Coenen, McAdam, Straub (2008)  EA_NAWM08   52 
 
                                                 
1 The results are reported in the conference volume, Monetary Policy Rules, Taylor (1999). 
Several of the models in this earlier comparison and robustness exercise are also included in 
our new monetary model database, including Rotemberg-Woodford (1999), McCallum and 
Nelson (1999), and Taylor (1993).  
2 See the Appendix of this paper for the current list of 38 models and Wieland, Cwik, Müller, 
Schmidt and Wolters (2009) for a detailed exposition of the platform for model comparison.  
The model base includes small calibrated text-book-style models, estimated medium- and 
large-scale models of the U.S. and euro area economies, and some estimated open-economy 
and multi-country models.  Software and models are available for download from 
http://www.macromodelbase.com. This platform relies on the DYNARE software for model 
solution and may be used with Matlab. For further information on DYNARE see Collard and 
Juillard (2001) and Juillard (1996) and http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/dynare.  
3 For example, the model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US 
model of Reifschneider et al (1999), both exhibited longer-lasting effects of policy shocks on 
U.S. GDP that peak several quarters later than in Taylor (1993a). See Levin, Wieland and 
Williams (1999, 2003) for a comparison.  
4 As noted by Smets and Wouters (2007) the risk premium shock represents a wedge between 
the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by the households 
and has similar effects as so-called net-worth shocks in models with an explicit financial 
sector such as Bernanke et al (1999).   
5 The paper was published in 2001 as NBER Working Paper 8403.  
6 Note, the response coefficients differ from the values reported in SW 2007. In equation (1), 
interest and inflation rates are annualized, while SW used quarterly rates. The original   53 
                                                                                                                                                        
specification in SW 2007 corresponds to 1 (1 0.81)(2.04 0.09 ) 0.22 0.81
q q q i
t t t t t t i y y i          , 
where the superscript q refers to quarterly rates that are not annualized. 
7 Smets and Wouters set wage and price markup shocks equal to zero in the derivation of the 
flex-price output measure used to define their output gap.   
8 CEE (2005) and ACEL(2004) model monetary policy in terms of innovations to the growth-
rate of money that they denote by μt:   0 1 1 2 2 3 3... t t t t t                   
9 Note, we use annualized interest and inflation rates and transcribe the CEE rule accordingly. 
In CEE 2005 they define their rule as: 11 (1 0.80)(1.5 0.1 ) 0.8
q q q i
t t t t t t i E y i        . CEE (2005) 
attribute this estimated rule to Clarida et al. (1999). However, the coefficients reported in 
Clarida et al (1999) are different. Their rule corresponds to  
11 (1 0.79)(2.15 0.93 ) 0.79
i
t t t t t t i E y i        . 
10 The CEE/ACEL model with SW Assumptions implies the following modifications:   We 
remove the timing constraints that were imposed on the structural model by the authors so 
that it coincides with the identification restrictions on the VAR that they used to obtain 
impulse responses for the monetary policy shock.  Furthermore we remove the constraint 
from the ACEL model that requires firms to finance the wage bill by borrowing cash in 
advance from a financial intermediary.  As a result of this constraint the interest rate has a 
direct effect on firms’ costs.  
11 Similar figures for the case of the CEE rule are provided in the online appendix.  
12 While the Taylor model simulates the components of GDP in real terms, the simulations in 
the SW and CEE models concern the nominal components divided by the GDP deflator. It is 
not possible to make the series directly comparable because none of the models accounts for 
the consumption and investment deflators separately from the GDP deflator.  
13 In the model file available from the AER website along with the SW (2007) paper the 
shock is multiplied with minus the consumption elasticity.  This is consistent with figure 2 of   54 
                                                                                                                                                        
that paper, where the shock appears as a “demand” shock, i.e. an increase has a positive effect 
on output. It is not consistent with equation (2) in SW (2007) that identifies the shock as a 
risk premium shock. In this case, an increase has a negative effect. We have modified the 
model file consistent with the notation as risk premium shock in equation (2) in SW (2007). 
In addition, we have checked that re-estimating the SW model with the shock entering the 
consumption Euler equation as defined by equation (2) in their paper does not have an 
important effect on the parameter estimates.  
14 Additional findings for a weight of 0.5 on the unconditional variance of the change of the 
nominal interest rate are reported in the additional appendix available online. Further 
sensitivity studies for intermediate weights have been conducted and are available from the 
authors upon request.  
15  A local optimum at less extreme values is observed for ρ = 0.01, α = 2.9, β0 = 0.5. 
16 Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we have investigated whether the SW 
model exhibits similar properties as the ACEL model if the number of shocks is reduced to 
the investment-specific and the neutral technology shock as in ACEL.  We find that the 
response coefficients on inflation and the output gap in the two-parameter and three-
parameter rules increase in absolute terms. However, the three parameter rule in the SW 
model does not take the extreme coefficient values observed in the ACEL model, nor do we 
observe multiple local optima as in the ACEL model. We make these findings available along 
with other material in an additional appendix that is available online. 
17 A number of recent contributions have emphasized the differences between flex-price 
measures of potential and more traditional views on the trending components of real activity 
(see Palmqvist (2007), Basu and Fernald (2009) and Gupta (2009)).  
18 See also Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Burriel, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez (2009). Beck and Wieland (2008) have instead proposed a non-linear cross-checking   55 
                                                                                                                                                        
mechanism that would correct the prescriptions from an output gap-based rule whenever 
there is statistical evidence of distorted policy outcomes, but take advantage of gap estimates 
in normal times. 
19 See Wieland, Cwik, Müller, Schmidt and Wolters (2009) for a detailed exposition of the 
platform for model comparison. Software and models are available for download from 
http://www.macromodelbase.com. IMFS WORKING PAPER SERIES 
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